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Introduction 
  Performing arts are built on collaboration.  Many performing arts organisations are driven by the 
missions of producing art and building a better world through the self-fulfilment of the artists but also through 
the benefit of art for the wider community.  So the co-operative ideal should sit well with performing arts 
organisations and yet there are very few registered co-operatives in performing arts in the UK, and only slightly 
more in France.  Our research investigates this paradox 
Culture and arts in general, requiring collective financing, tend to receive government subsidy to a 
greater or lesser extent.. They are particularly at risk in the current economic crisis. Within the cultural sector, 
performing arts companies are particularly fragile (Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011. The performing arts are 
essential to society, not only for the artistic value created, but also in economic terms (Nicolas, 2010). Many 
performing arts organisations are hybrids; they earn much of their income from trade but also receive 
government subsidy.  In this the sector could be likened to agriculture or any other sector which enjoys 
government support. They are closely linked to regional economic development.  They play an important role in 
a country’s economic and social development. They are also business entities: they are employers, producers, 
consumers and partners in the marketing and promotion of their cities, regions and countries.  Their 
sustainability is thus not just a sector specific question. 
Most European governments are cutting their budgets for cultural activities. In the UK the Arts Council 
budget was cut by 30% in 2010 to take effect over four years.
1
 This has had a large impact on the independent 
(non-commercial) performing arts sector in the UK. In France, where the cultural sector is historically heavily 
supported by public funding, the culture budget has remained stable in 2011. But this situation is clearly 
precarious,  French political will and capacity to maintain such public financing being highly questionable.  
In this context, investigating new economic models
2
 to encourage sustainability, to secure funding, to 
safeguard employment and to ensure a diversified cultural output is required. This is a practical aspect of this 
research. In the UK, most independent (non-commercial) performing arts organizations are not for profit, many 
are registered charities; similarly in France, most artistic troops have non-profit associative status. These 
organisations may need to adopt a more “business” like orientation in order to survive in the current crisis. Co-
operation may offer a possible route (Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011, Sinapi & Juno Delgado, 2011).  
The research also has a theoretical aspect. Within the literature on the co-operative movement, although 
a growing emphasis is being placed on services co-operatives
3
, there is little about performing arts, or arts in 
                                                          
1 Arts Council UK 
2 There are growing interests among international cultural institutions to identify innovative business models for the sector ; The 
Forum d'Avignon, which defines itself as the "Davos of Culture", dedicates a large research area to innovative "culture, financing, economic 
models" (Forum d'Avignon, 2012, [en ligne : http://www.forum-avignon.org/en/culture-financing-economic-models]). 
3 See esp. Birchal (2010). 
general. We intend to add to this literature: our exploratory research should help to better understand co-
operation and diverse models within performing arts and the motivations and perceptions of performing arts 
organisations.  It may be possible to suggest ways to improve co-op legal design in order to meet the needs of 
arts organisations. This approach will contribute to the debate about the emergence of new models in co-
operatives (Cook & Chaddad, 2004), especially in service and collective interest organisations (Birchall, 2011, 
Atherton et al, 2011). 
This chapter will be organised as follows. In the first part, we discuss the research question, present the case 
methodology.  We focus on three key research questions: What forms does co-operation take in performing arts? 
What are the perceived benefits and/or disadvantages of co-operation in such organisations? Can co-operation 
help to face the crisis in the sector (does it promote sustainability)? The following parts address these research 
questions through a comparison of eight case studies, four French, three UK, one Italian. We conclude with a 
discussion of the new forms of co-operation these organisations demonstrate. 
1. Research questions, methodology, case selection 
 
Our research question is rooted in the following observation. Iconic arts organisations in France formed 
as co-operatives in the 1970's:  for instance the well-known Théâtre du Soleil founded around Ariadne 
Mnouchkine and the Café de la Gare, which involved the famous French artists like Coluche, Miou-Miou or, for 
a time, G. Depardieu,. Yet, whilst discussion with case study companies indicated that artists have sympathy 
with the co-operative form, and while some research suggests that co-operation in performing arts organizations 
(PAO) may promote sustainability (Sinapi & Juno-Delgado, 2011) or help in the light of the current structural 
changes in the sector (Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011), a majority of French PAO's are formed as not-for profit 
organizations – not as co-ops. Similarly in the UK, most independent PAOs are not for profits, many are 
charities – not registered as co-ops. Very few performing arts organisations in the UK are co-ops4 and to a lesser 
extent in France. In a very large sample of more than 500 French theatre companies, Urrutiaguer & Henry (2011) 
only identify one  co-operative and only a few considering changing from associations to co-operative (SCOP or 
SCIC), while only 3.5% of the sample companies indicating a desire to develop mutualisation. Some of the co-
operative principles are nonetheless observed as 13% of the sample companies have a collective managerial 
board. Our purpose is to explore why so few performing arts organisations are formal co-operatives.  
 
1. Research question 
This research issue is subdivided into three key research questions:  
 What form does co-operation take in performing arts organisations? 
 What are the ex-post, in and ex ante perceived advantages and disadvantages to being a co-op 
in this sector?  
 In particular, does being a co-operative help with regard to the effects of the current economic 
crisis (budget cuts especially)? 
Our hypothesis is that in the performing arts, many organizations act as co-operatives without legal recognition 
(registering as a co-op (UK) or adopting co-operative status (France & Italy)). We thus define co-operatives in 
reference to the way business is conducted rather than the legal constitution. The “Practical Tools for Defining 
Co-operatives” developed by Atherton et al (2011) relates more to how a business behaves rather than how it is 
legally structured. The tool focuses on member control and co-operative ethos as being the co-op’s key 
dimensions. Although the tool was developed for organisations to self-identify as co-operatives, we are using it 
to identify organisations which are acting as cooperative but which do not necessarily claim co-operative status. 
                                                          
4 A panel discussion at the Independent Theatre Council summer event in July 2011 about co-operatives uncovered no current co-
ops amongst the approximately 200 member organisations attending the event. 
The research questions are addressed through a set of interview questions and are mapped against Atherton et 
al's practical tools, as set out in the appendices. 
2. Methodology  
  
Our comparison is initially based on a "country" criterion: we compare French, British and  Italian cases. It is 
secondly based on a "moment" criterion: we compare ex ante, in and ex post perceived co-ops pro's and con's. 
We consider PAOs at three stages of co-operative engagement: companies considering becoming co-op's (ex-
ante perception), companies functioning as co-op's (in perception) (using Atherton et al’s critieria but allowing 
for the fact that these organisations have not necessarily self-identified as being co-operatives) and companies 
ceasing or having ceased to be co-ops (ex-post perception). In each case, we raise the question "Why?" :  
 Why is the organisation considering becoming a co-operative? (ex ante perception) 
 Why had the organisation chosen  a  co-operative ethos? (in perception) 
 Why is the organisation ceasing / has ceased to be a co-operative? (ex post perception) 
3. Case selection 
In this research, we focus on small and medium sized performing arts organizations (total revenues of 
less than £ 4million /Euros 5m
5
). PAOs traditionally include theatre, dance, music, street performing arts, circus, 
marionettes and story-telling (contes). Theatre is the most common in France; our cases reflect this
6
. The  age of 
our selected cases vary between 1 and 20 years, which also corresponds to the French industry (nr of companies 
significantly drop after 20 years, average age is 12 years, median is 11)
7
. The scope of our cases is thus largely 
representative. The UK cases are all organisations of more than twenty years’ standing, one umbrella body for 
the independent theatre sector, an orchestra, celebrating its twenty fifth anniversary in 2012, and a touring theatre 
company which has been in existence for forty years. They vary in size from turnover of £3.6m (euros 4.6m) to 
turnover of £200,000.(euros 257,000).  
Table 1 –  Selected case studies and comparison criteria  
Comparison criteria: Moment 
/ Country 
FRANCE ITALY UK 
(ex ante) considering becoming 
a co-op 
Coursive Boutaric Fanny & Alexander  Independent Theatre 
Council 
(in) Sharing the co-operative 
ethos 





Coop E Orchestra of the Age of 
Enlightenment 
(ex post) ceasing / having 
ceased to be a co-op' 
Compagnie 4 litres 12 none
9
 Red Ladder 
 
                                                          
5 In France, the average company's budget is estimated to be €131.000 (Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011)  €115.000 for theatre, 
varying between €25.000 & €320.000 (Avise, 2005). 70% to 77% of companies' budgets are below k€165 (Arcadi 2007, Urrutiaguer and 
Henry, 2011). 
6 Theatre is estimated to represent 48% of the PAO's in France in 2009, dance 20%, the others resp. to 8%, 6%, 6% and 3%, while 
10% of companies declare hybrid activities of at least two of the above (Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011). 
7 Urrutiaguer and Henry (id.) 
8 Since two legal forms for cooperative exist in France, we selected one of each: a SCOP and a SCIC. These legal parameters are 
further discussed in the second part of the chapter. 
9 We failed to identify Italian performing arts coop's having ceased their activity, due to insufficient access to Italian data. This 
should be viewed as a limit to the case study for this country. The Italian case will thus only be considered as an additional and illustrative 
perspective to the French – UK comparison we draw in this research. 
2  Case Study Summary 
French Cases 
SOLENTINAME 
The first cooperative is a SCOP (see next section for explanation). Solentiname was created by four young artists 
from different fields of the performing arts and an administrator. It was formed as a co-operative five years ago. 
Its purpose is to be a "performing arts co-operative whose aim is the practice, creation and diffusion of arts with 
an approach which is militant, citizen, poetic and ludique". It has grown smoothly since its creation, both 
artistically and financially. Its object is artistic and it assembles artists of different disciplines (theatre, dance and 
music). It also includes a social dimension and a territorial (region level) anchoring (two contrasting examples 
may be given: contract for cultural actions with the regional hospital, participation in the Avignon festival). The 
financial and budgetary management is prudent: each project is intended to generate a margin to cover the co-
operative fixed costs; a targeted profit level is calculated each year, which is fully retained as reserves in order to 
create sufficient equity level; they aim at a certain financial independence by keeping their subvention rate below 
30% (this is a choice and not a legal obligation). The co-operative shows balanced budgets and is financially 
sustainable.  
Solentiname had originally chosen to be a SCOP on the basis of founding members’ past experiences, in favor of 
co-operation. This choice was first motivated by the artists’ (members’) wish to have full control over their own 
activities. The founders also chose to create this scop in order share (managerial, administrative, legal) skills and 
resources between their different artistic projects, in order to have access to and be able to afford them. The 
choice of co-operative is also dictated by their adherence to democratic values of co-ops and to a militant 
dimension: Solentiname members view co-operative status as a way to claim their professionalism and to make 
society aware of the economic contribution of performing arts. PAO's are often seen in France as over-
subsidized, as a non-sustainable activity or even as a cost to society. Choosing a commercial legal form (co-
operative) which is at  the same time coherent with their democratic and philosophical values, is a militant act: 
they affirm that performing arts create not only social and artistic value, but also economic value, jobs, revenues 
etc. and can make a living from their work for artists ; in particular, they  refuse to engage in  voluntary work. 
Choosing co-operative status is a way to demand social recognition of the economic contribution of performing 
arts and its professionalism. This aspect of co-operative status appears as fundamental in this case study. The co-
operative status is also viewed as more professional and serious (than associations), which has in some cases 
helped to obtain contracts vis a vis some customers (for cultural action for example).  
The perceived obstacles of co-operative status are mainly financial: because they are a co-operative, they cannot 
benefit from certain local subsidies or support; this is not due to any official legal constraint but to the 
discretionary decisions of some local authorities (some others on the contrary support their co-operative status). 
Besides, being a co-operative generates additional costs compared to an association (higher income tax rate, 
contribution to be paid to the co-operative movement). 
L'Autre Bout du Monde 
 
The second French registered co-operative is a SCIC (see next section for explanation): L'Autre Bout du Monde 
is a bistrot-spectacle located in Dijon (Burgundy). It was created in 2009. Its purpose is to promote local young 
artists (musicians) on a boat ("Péniche Cancale") which has been transformed into a restaurant - theatre. The 
restaurant aims similarly at promoting local wine producers (Burgundy wine and gastronomy). The place is also 
rented, during week time, which brings additional revenue to the co-operative. The company is growing and 
benefits from support from local authorities and from a large audience. It has however made losses since its 
creation and is, in practice, not yet financially sustainable.  The funder (and owner of the boat)  has had  to add 
money to the project every year in the form of gifts (and receives no additional shares for this)..  
The main motivation which led the creative members to form their organization as a co-operative are comparable 
to Solentiname: it is perceived as a militant act, not only in ethical terms (attachment to social economy 
principles) but also to claim and demonstrate that artistic projects are also economic entities, which can and must 
be economically sustainable. Co-operatives are seen as a balance between creative activity, commercial activity 
and not-for-profit cultural organisations. Choosing a co-operative status was perceived as a help in  setting up a 
cultural project which would also include an economic logic. The main perceived advantages of  co-operative 
status for PAO are the following:  to link ethics, militantism and commercial activity ; stronger involvement of 
members and employees than in a "traditional" commercial society ; adhesion to social economy values 
embodied by the SCIC status. Besides, some specific funds were obtained at the creation of the SCIC, which are 
related to this specific status. This was however not determinant in the choice of the status. 
Several drawbacks to being a co-operative are observed: Difficulty in the decision process due to the need for 
discussions and consensus among a large number of persons, diversity and multiplicity of the members and 
interests; the need to have a manager who agrees with the ideal of democratic management. However one of the 
primary reasons for choosing to be a co-operative (financial sustainability, expected better than for associations), 
has not been achieved: the project is not financially sustainable as it relies on regular injections of funding from 
the boat owner. No financial advantage (except on setting up) can really be proved to come from co-operative 
status. On the other hand, the competition among artists does not appear as an obstacle to co-operation. On the 
contrary, collaboration, artistic and human, within the co-operative, is seen as one of its strongest advantages. 
The two other French cases are on the one hand an association considering becoming a co-operative 
(Coursive Boutaric) and on the other a SCOP ceasing its activity (4l12). 
Coursive Boutaric 
 
Coursive Boutaric is a non-profit association which is in the process of becoming a co-operative (a SCIC, as 
L’Autre Bout du Monde, discussed above). It is a culturally based organization which is working with a 
primarily social aim of regenerating a neighbourhood through creative projects. It is based in a partially disused 
and run down building in the Gresilles quarter of Dijon. 
Coursive Boutaric will bring together about thirty cultural organizations based in the building and current 
(domestic) residents along with the local government of Dijon. The funding comes from several sources, 
including local co-operative societies, but is predominantly public money. It will be a multi-stakeholder co-
operative, for shared services.  
The advantages of the co-operative form are seen to be the flexibility of the organization to represent the 
interests of the variety of members, the efficiency of shared services and the sharing of knowledge between 
members. The disadvantages are seen to be that the complexity of democratic processes makes them 
cumbersome, there is the danger of “free riding”, members may not be able to co-operate. There does not appear 
to be any financial advantage for Coursive Boutaric in adopting the co-operative form. 
4l12 
Compagnie 4 litres 12 ('4l12') was created 40 years ago. It is a small theatre company. Initially formed as an 
Association Loi 1901, it changed its legal form to a co-operative (SCOP) 25 years ago, grouping as co-operative 
members the four historic members of the troop around the artistic director – who became the co-operative 
manager. Its primary purpose is artistic creation: creation and diffusion of theatre. 
4l12 is a theatre company recognized at the regional and national level ; it benefits from the DRAC (ministry of 
culture) convention. Its activity has fluctuated with the economic cycle of the sector with success over the last 40 
years. The company conforms to all legal obligations of a SCOP in France. It has no debt. 4l12 thus appears to 
be a sustainable and robust company, at the artistic, organizational and economic levels. The company is 
managed and fully controlled by its members, in all decisions (strategic, artistic and day to day). It fully 
conforms to Atherton et al's criteria, in terms of membership as well as co-operative ethos. Yet, since the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, the reduction in the French cultural budgets has impacted 4l12 very 
negatively (directly, with the end of the DRAC subvention and indirectly with the reduction in theatre financing). 
The company's financial position has been critical for the last three years. In this context, a specific project 
which generated significant losses could not be absorbed and 4l12 have decided to go into liquidation. 
The initial reason why the members chose to become a co-op was political: in 1986, the right-wing 
ministry of culture (ministry Leotard) put pressure on companies to adopt commercial legal forms in order to 
improve their professionalism. 4l12 chose the co-operative form, since association was no longer possible. This 
choice was dictated by several motivations: adhesion to political and philosophical co-operative values of 
equality and democracy; perceived synergy between the collective dimension of theatre and that of co-operation; 
image and exemplarity of historic artistic co-operatives (Café de la Gare, Théâtre du Soleil). The SCOP status is 
perceived as having provided no advantage to the company, as compared to associative status, other than  
demonstrating adherence to co-operative values (democracy and sharing) . On the contrary, a series of obstacles 
are perceived: incompatibility between the commercial objectives of a SCOP and the artistic purpose of a theatre 
company ; bureaucracy attached to managing a SCOP compared to an association (accounting revisions, 
revisions and control by the co-operative movement, legal complexity) ; legal constraints e.g. limitations on 
hiring artists (SCOP is incompatible to some extent with intermittence regime and with some subsidized 
employment contracts dedicated to arts like "TUC"); managerial discordance, as the obligation to have a 
"manager " is not compatible with real democracy within the troop; financial discordance, as the retained 
earnings principle within co-operatives in France, inspired from investment needs in agriculture, is not 
compatible with the need to retain money to finance artistic research for future creation (while it is possible with 
associations). Finally, there is a feeling that public funding is more difficult to obtain for a SCOP, especially if it 
shows (even small and retained as reserves) surpluses. This is incompatible with the fact that public authorities 
should fund sustainable companies, which need to build capital  by retaining – thus generating – a certain level 
of profit. But, in the end, the biggest difficulty for this organization, in the current difficult economic context, is 
not due to its status; the company’s difficulties owe more to the way in which public funding is being allocated 
and to the organization of expert commissions. 
4. The Italian case: Coop E (/ Fanny & Alexander) 
For Italy, we have selected one case represented by two related organisations : Co-op E and Fanny & 
Alexander.  
Co-op E was set up as a co-operative in January 2012 by  four arts organizations (dance, contemporary 
theatre) which were, up to this date, independent non-profit associations (ASBL's
10
). The founding members 
(company Fanny & Alexander) have a very good reputation; their theatre company has been successful for 20 
years. Their willingness to associate with the three other younger companies is primarily viewed as a way to 
share the management of the local artistic space of the city of Ravenna, which has entrusted Fanny & Alexandre 
with it for a long time. The city has recently refurbished the space and is installing  a bar. Co-operative status, 
because it has a commercial purpose, is perceived as better adapted than the non-profit associative previous 
status to manage this space and bar, all the more as the company's revenues are mostly from sales and co-
production. The choice to create the co-operative is however primarily motivated by artistic objectives and 
militancy. They "love" the artistic work of those younger companies and expect this artistic co-operation to 
stimulate and develop further creativity and esthetic objects. Meanwhile, within the association, Fanny & 
Alexander’s reputation should help promote the younger companies; the objective of the co-operative is to be a 
kind of launch pad for young talented artistic companies. To some extent, the co-operative, thanks to the history 
and fame of Fanny & Alexander, carries more weight with the public authorities and can command more funding 
and space than the companies could separately.  The adoption of co-operative status is a militant act : militancy 
for a project mixing arts, sense, territory, politics (democracy and "anarchy"). This approach is exemplary and 
also aims at being an example or a pilot for future expansion of this model throughout Italy. It should be noted 
that Coop E is both endorsing a co-operative legal status and also perfectly suits all criteria of Atherton et al, 
regarding membership and co-operative ethos. 
Besides the philosophical, esthetical and artistic principles which are the real objectives and motivations of 
the co-operative, some additional (though less significant) advantages are seen in the co-operative form : the 
status conveys an image of seriousness that association does not, especially in Italy (where the associative 
                                                          
10 «Associazione Culturale» is the official Italian denomination, it's automatically an organization «senza fini di lucro») : non for 
profit association (authors translation). 
network seems to be somewhat corrupt) ; the network of co-operatives is very efficient and helpful for arts 
organisations (legal information, help for creation, budget advice, etc); the shared financial resources would also 
enable each company to finance artistic research and creation, alternating years / periods of show and periods of 
research in a more stable and secure financial environment.. Finally, the hypothesis that competition among 
artists is an obstacle to co-operation is rejected; on the contrary, in this case study, co-operation comes after 
years of collaboration among artists. Artists are collaborators much more than competitors. "We see now young 
companies with the same collaborative perspective; there is something in the air, in culture, in our city, where 
collaboration is more important than competition. Theatre is a small market, but collaboration will make its 
space grow and develop its market. Competition is a false problem" (verbatim) This suggests that a new 
generation of artists is ready for co-operation, for co-operation which is not only an ethos but also an artistic and 
militant identity. 
 
5. The UK cases 
Independent Theatre Council  
 
The Independent Theatre Council (ITC) has existed for almost 40 years. It is a representative body of about 400 
independent (non-commercial) theatre companies throughout the United Kingdom. Membership varies annually 
(between 300 -500) as it is based on annual subscriptions.  
Since 2010 cuts in public funding for the arts in the UK have led ITC to redefine its activities and organisation. 
ITC is now considering becoming a co-op. It is not a registered charity (see next section for a discussion of UK 
charities). 
Although it falls in the first category – of an organisation considering becoming a co-operative, looking at legal 
status – ITC already conforms to the co-operative ethos as recognised by Atherton et al,. Most importantly, it is a 
membership organisation, a shared services organisation, controlled by the members (who subscribe annually) 
for their benefit. The members are organisations or individuals. The members voted that the level of 
subscriptions should be set at a point where the larger companies would support the smaller to an extent. In this 
ITC is showing “parrainage” as noted in the French and Italian case studies.  
The membership elects the board. All board members are members of ITC. 
ITC does not distribute profits but it has, over the years, retained surpluses so that it is in a position to weather 
the current crisis, to a certain extent. The benefits to members are access to professional advice, management and 
operational training, networking with others who share the same values which can lead to smaller networks 
sharing resources – spaces, administrative capacity etc – and advocacy and political voice for the sector.   
Control is exercised by the members through elections to the governing board and through formal and informal 
canvassing of opinion. ITC provides an advice help-line which also acts as a method of monitoring what is 
happening in the sector, highlighting the issues that are important to members in a rapidly changing environment 
– economically and legally. 
Members are regularly asked to debate and sign up to the shared values of the organisation. ITC organises 
several networking events with arts funders as well as peers, each year. ITC acts as a lobbyist on behalf of the 
sector. To a large extent, ITC can be credited with articulating the existence of the independent theatre sector in 
the UK. In that sense, it can be seen as pivotal for the independent theatre sector in the UK. In this it can be 
compared to Fanny & Alexander above, where the organisation is consciously developing the sector. 
It is significant that the first purpose of ITC is to provide a framework to allow great art to be created and to 
thrive. The “professionalization” of the sector is seen as the means by which artistic quality can be protected and 
art can thrive. The purpose is primarily the quality of the production.  
ITC is now entirely membership funded. It was previously also project funded by the Arts Council (until 2010). 
It was funded by the Arts Council to provide training for the sector. The Arts Council in England & Wales is an 
“arms-length” funding body. It is funded by the Department for Culture, Media & Sport but it makes its own 
decisions about which organisations it supports. Supporting ITC’s training schemes was part of a deliberate 
policy to “professionalise” the sector. When the funding for those activities (amounting to half the overall 
funding for the organisation) was withdrawn, ITC had to reduce its staff and also moved premises but, in doing 
so, although it was difficult, it retained, even regained, its sense of mission and purpose. The current economic 
crisis is probably the most serious financial situation that the organisation has faced. That is because it relies on 
membership subscriptions and its members and potential members are suffering cut backs in funding as well. 
The future looks less secure than it has done for many years. 
It is an example of a shared services co-operative (following Atherton et al) without being a registered co-
operative. The board of ITC has recently discussed the possibility of becoming a registered co-operative. The 
benefits of becoming a co-operative are not seen as financial but more as confirming the democratic values and 
aligning ITC with the wider co-operative movement. 
There are no perceived direct benefits of becoming a co-operative other than the potential for actively 
recognising the synergy between creative values and those of the co-operative movement. This recognition of the 
synergy in shared values is not insignificant; however it is not that straightforward either. 
The history of the co-operative movement with independent theatre in the UK is quite complicated. There were 
several co-operatives in the performing arts – particularly in theatre - in the mid-80s but the political climate of 
the period was antagonistic towards them and most either folded (due to reduced funding) or changed their status 
(see Red Ladder below). One would expect there to have been a revival of co-operatives within the sector over 
the past decade (before the current government took power). But this did not happen. Co-operative status in the 
performing arts is not seen as a militant, political act in the UK as it is in France. This might be because the 
membership based company limited by guarantee (non- profit- distributing) form is so prevalent and lends itself 
easily to democratic governance combined with community purpose. This is an area that it would be fruitful to 
research further from the co-operative movement’s point of view. 
It might also be due to the image of co-ops within the performing arts in the UK as rather old-fashioned and 
bureaucratic. In this the findings are compatible with expectations from the co-operative literature. However, 
although it was noted that some members use the free advice line a lot more than others, members voted recently 
for a tapered subscriptions structure which means that the larger organisations within ITC subsidise the smaller 
ones. The potential for free-riding is noted but not considered a problem. 
There are a few other shared services co-operatives within the performing arts in the UK. There is an actors’ 
agency which has been in existence as long as ITC and has now been copied by technicians in the film industry 
in partnership with their union (BECTU) and Co-operatives UK. These are employment agencies where the 
actors/technicians retain control over their employment. 
Orchestra of the Age of Enlightenment 
 
The second case study, The Orchestra of the Age of Enlightenment (OAE) was formed in 1986. It passes most of 
the Atheron et al tests. It acts as a source of work for its members and in this it could be compared to the actors’ 
and technicians’ agencies mentioned above. But it is not a registered co-operative. It is a company limited by 
guarantee, without share capital, governed by a board of its members. It is included in our study because of the 
importance given in its governance to the inclusion of player/members on the elected board. Because of the 
emphasis on player/members' participation on the governing board, its emphasis on education (for young players 
and conductors within the orchestra and for schools and the public through an extensive education and outreach 
programme) and its partnership working, the OAE can be seen as sharing the co-operative ethos. It is a registered 
charity. 
Like ITC, the OAE can be credited with changing the sector of the arts in which it operates in the UK, and doing 
so expressly. The OAE is an orchestra specialising in playing music on instruments of the period in which the 
music was composed. It was formed originally as a band of musicians sharing a vision of how an orchestra could 
be organised as a group of players rather than as the followers of a particular conductor. So from the very 
beginning the ethos was democratic, independent in the sense of self-governing, self-financing (not publicly 
funded) and revolutionary. In its revolutionary intent the OAE could be likened to our French case studies but 
the revolution was more artistic than political. The aim was to provide a place where like- minded people could 
produce art of a very high quality in the way they wanted to, together. The ethos of mutual respect amongst the 
players and joy in the music is fundamental.  
At the start there was a small group of musicians who collaborated to organise the first concerts but in doing so 
they signed up about one hundred interested parties -musicians and others - to be members of a loose association 
for the purpose of performing period music, particularly in the UK and with a variety of conductors. So the 
initial impetus for the OAE came from the players, and the initial concerns were to be able to play where and 
how they wanted to, with others who shared the same vision and also, importantly, to learn and develop together. 
The OAE does not employ the musicians. They work freelance. This means that they do not have the same 
protection, employer’s pension contributions etc. as they would have if they were employed. Some orchestras in 
the UK employ musicians; many do not. Many rely on freelance performers. The disadvantages for freelance 
musicians are that they do not have the security of an employed post but, on the other hand, they have the 
freedom to work with whoever they choose to. Initially the OAE only performed a few concerts a year and the 
musicians were more like a “bank” of people who could be called on if needed. 
Gradually, the OAE became established, through the support of corporate sponsors and then, after some time, 
Arts Council funding. Key factors in the successful growth of the OAE have been the partnership arrangements 
they have managed to secure with the South Bank Centre in London and Glyndebourne Opera in Sussex which 
allows the orchestra to have a core programme that runs through most of the year. Many of the musicians now 
rely on the OAE for a significant part of their work each year. 
The orchestra has funding, albeit reduced from previous levels, agreed with the Arts Council for three years from 
2011 which allows a degree of security in forward planning. Most of the income, however, comes from 
charitable trading activities – sales of tickets for concerts, fees for concerts.  The business model exemplified by 
the OAE is very different to those of the French companies studied in this research. Two thirds of the income 
comes from charitable trading activities. The other third is made up of public subsidy and grants and donations 
from trusts, foundations, corporations and wealthy individuals. Of the total income only approximately one tenth 
is direct public subsidy. The French and UK case studies here fall true to form – the UK looks to France for 
enlightened state support and France looks to the UK for models of commercial engagement.
11
 There are 
tensions within both models. 
The board of the OAE is aware of the danger for arts organisations dependent on fee income and 
sponsorship of “chasing the money”. The board is partly made up of player/members and partly (the majority 
because of charity rules) of volunteers drawn from outside the orchestra (who then become non-player/members). 
The advantage of this arrangement is that people can be brought onto the board for their specialist expertise 
(finance, law etc.) or for their external networking connections. 
There is an internal artistic direction committee (ADC) to balance the more business oriented approach 
of the board and there are several informal internal mechanisms for discussion of repertoire and artistic choices. 
The choice of programme can determine the cost and the likely income generation; it impacts on employment 
opportunities for musician members. It is an area for disagreement and tension within the organisation. OAE 
shares with the co-operative structure the disadvantages of democratic processes – they can be unwieldy, time 
consuming and may not make the “best” decisions in the end. Best commercially, artistically or from the 
individual members’ point of view may not be the same. Red Ladder, the next case study, voted for a 
hierarchical structure for these reasons. 
                                                          
11 The Franco-British Council Report Committing to Culture highlights the differences in cultural funding in the two countries and 
examines what each can learn from the other. 
The OAE has built up reserves over the past decade and now carries sufficient to satisfy the Charity 
Commission recommendations and to be able to weather a reduction in income (for a while) and to also be able 
to take artistic risks where these are justified for the development of the organisation. The point about artistic 
risk is explicitly made in the Trustees’ report. Nonetheless, the OAE is facing the same trading climate as most 
arts organisations at the moment making some difficult decisions to contain costs and generate income.  
Being a member of the ADC can be onerous because it is time consuming and can be difficult if 
decisions have to be made regarding repertoire and orchestra size which impact on the amount of members’ 
work and consequently on their welfare. There are other duties which have to be undertaken for the smooth 
running of the organisation and there can be an element of “free-riding” where members do not take their share 
of the responsibility. Again, the OAE shares the disadvantages of the co-operative structure because of its 
democratic nature.  
There is also a tension between the pursuit of artistic quality and the individual welfare of musician 
members. There can be a conflict of interests. An attempt was made to introduce a system of peer review of 
performance a few years ago which met with considerable resistance because of this tension. The welfare of the 
collective may not be the same as the long-term artistic development of the orchestra. 
The OAE has instigated a 25 year review looking back over the first twenty five years and developing 
strategies for the future. This review is considering the structure of the orchestra and the transition arrangements 
for the older players (some of them founders) to gradually step down and hand over to a new generation. There is 
tension here too because the new generation will not necessarily share the older generations’ vision and values. 
If they do, and if the orchestra can carry on with the same spirit it will be a validation of what the founders and 
long standing members have achieved. Perhaps, if the OAE could see itself as part of a larger movement (as ITC 
is considering) it would be easier to hand the values on. It was interesting that whilst the members interviewed 
recognised the importance of collective artistic intellectual endeavour and democratic accountability within the 
OAE they did not consider the orchestra to be a co-operative – though it definitely “isn’t capitalist”. 
Red Ladder 
The third British case, Red Ladder, is a touring theatre company, formed in 1968, as part of the radical socialist 
agitprop movement, as a loose association and formally constituted as a company in 1974. So it has been in 
existence for more than 40 years. It was originally constituted as a co-operative but ceased to be one in the mid 
1980's. It has considered, and rejected, becoming a co-operative again on several occasions since then. It 
therefore falls into the third category and provides insight into historical reasons for ceasing to be a co-operative 
and also into why companies are not becoming co-operatives in response to the current economic crisis. .  It 
registered as a charity in 1994. 
Red Ladder is based in Leeds. It is an important part of the cultural landscape in the North of England 
and an important part of the cultural infrastructure in Leeds, supporting the development of several younger 
companies and training individuals in theatre skills. The company recognises its obligation to help other arts 
organisations within the area. It fosters and develops partnerships with other organisations (writers, technicians, 
other theatre companies) to build the cultural fabric of the region. In this, Red Ladder is demonstrating 
“parrainage” (see French/Italian studies and ITC above), and it is expressly developing the sector within its own 
region. 
Red Ladder is a company limited by guarantee with a volunteer board which exercises control and sets 
strategy but the day to day running and implementation of strategy is left to the artistic director and producer. 
The company recently decided, through a democratic process, involving the staff, board and major funder (Arts 
Council) to adopt a hierarchical structure which, it is felt, more accurately reflects the responsibilities within the 
organisation – which lives or dies by its artistic reputation. 
Members of the board are drawn from the local community for their specialist knowledge and their 
connections. The long standing chairman is a local councillor, other board members are drawn from academic 
partners (local universities) and others bring specialist skills – PR and marketing for instance.   
The company has faced several crises over its relatively long life. The current economic crisis and the 
cuts in public subsidy count amongst the most severe. Red Ladder has had its funding from the Arts Council, the 
major funder, cut by 42% (based on 2009). This has meant losing a member of staff (from 3 to 2) and re-
organising the way in which some projects are delivered. Red Ladder, like the other two UK examples, has built 
up sufficient reserves (three months operations) to weather a temporary downturn in income. It has used some of 
its reserves to cover expenditure in the first year of grant funding cuts but has simultaneously focussed on 
increasing income and reputation through good PR for strong productions. 
The company has changed over the years. It is currently more political in its activities than it has been 
for two decades. Part of its mission is to “awaken in modern society an emotional intelligence and literacy”, 
through partnership working with artists and organisations to create theatre and encourage debate in unusual 
places. The focus is on global justice and inspiring a younger generation. It is interesting that the company has 
decided not to become a co-operative again, despite the very collaborative nature of the way in which it works 
with partners and the way in which it creates and forms part of local and national artistic and activist networks. 
This is similar to the OAE (artistically if not politically) and in contrast with the French examples. 
The reasons given for Red Ladder not wanting to become a co-operative again were the need to be able 
to take decisions rapidly and to be able to take artistic risks. It was felt that the co-operative structures would be 
an obstacle to this essential flexibility without bringing compensatory benefits. This echoes OAE problems 
which seem to be caused by having such democratic internal decision-making. Both organisations highlight the 
danger of losing artistic edge through making decisions by committee. This is noted in the literature on co-
operatives as a potential hazard. It could be an area which merits further study from the co-operatives point of 
view as it may be an important obstacle to performing/producing arts organisations adopting a full blown co-
operative structure. 
3. What forms does co-operation take in the performing arts? 
 
We can now address our first research question: What forms does co-operation take in PAOs? As 
explained above, our underlying hypothesis is that PAO's may be organised as co-operatives without claiming 
legal recognition or registration. We define cooperatives in reference to the way in which business is conducted 
rather than  the legal constitution, referring to the “Practical Tools for Defining Co-operatives” developed by 
Atherton et al (2011). Our research questions were investigated through a series of interview questions.  These 
questions were mapped against Atherton et al’s self-diagnosis tool kit in Practical Tools for defining Co-
operatives (2011) . This mapping is set out in Appendix 1. 
Atherton et al's tool is anchored in the seven co-operative principles
12
; it focuses on member control 
(through ownership and/or participation) and co-operative ethos.  
We summarize the answers against Atherton et al’s questions in Appendix 2.  We scored these answers 
using Atheron et al’s self-diagnosis tool and Graph 1 presents the results.   Because some of these organisations 
do not see themselves as part of the co-operative movement, although they do see themselves as part of a 
collaborative “sector” or way of working, the tool can only give us a rough picture, but it is indicative. 1,2, and 3, 
Tesco, John Lewis and Suma are from the graph in Atherton et al, p  and act as benchmarks here.  
 
                                                          
12 ICA's seven well known cooperative principles are : 1. Voluntary and Open Membership; 2. Democratic Member Control; (esp. 
one member, one vote); 3. Member Economic Participation; 4. Autonomy and Independence; 5. Education, Training and Information; 6. 
Cooperation among Cooperatives; 7. Concern for Community. 
  
The results of mapping our interviews against Atherton et al’s tools and analysing the nature of the 
organisations (what is the primary purpose?), are summarised in table 2 below. Two cases do not qualify, even 
with allowances, as acting as co-operatives because they cannot respond positively to the membership control 
questions in the tool kit. More interestingly, we found that in three cases status as a co-operative, or not, did not 
correspond with the reality of the organisation’s behaviour. 
ITC and OAE (8 &9 in the chart) in the UK qualify as co-ops while not being registered as co-ops, and 
not really considering themselves to be co-ops; L'Autre Bout du monde (5 above) on the contrary, is a registered 
co-op but does not qualify as acting as a co-op, according to Atherton et al  guide.  
Contrary to the other French cases, which fully match Atherton et al's criteria, L'Autre bout du monde 
fails to qualify as a co-op according to those criteria, although it is legally registered as co-operative form (SCIC). 
While it fully matches the co-operative ethos, the member ownership is to some extent questionable. The SCIC 
is member based; members decide upon profit allocation and have equal voting rights. Yet, when looking in 
details in the legal ownership and in the organization, it appears that the place itself (the boat), on which the 
SCIC is entirely dependent, belongs to the Director of the SCIC. The boat is an asset belonging to a traditional 
commercial society (a SARL), owned by the SCIC manager ; it is rented to the SCIC, with a contract that can be 
denounced by the SARL's owner. Yet, the self-existence of the SCIC and its activity rely on the use of the 
restaurant-boat which relies in the hands on the SARL's owner (and SCIC manager). It implies that if he decided 
to cancel the boat rental agreement, the SCIC would have to stop its activity. The members do not have, in this 
respect, control over their productive tools and assets. This situation also gives the manager power over the SCIC 
and its decisions, even in day to day decisions such as hiring or firing of people,  independently to some extent of 
the member decisions. The principle of democracy is not really observable, although the governance complies 
with the principle one member – one vote. .We may here consider that although the legal form is a co-operative, 
Atherton et al's criteria apply only partially. 
Legal status is thus neither sufficient nor essential to guarantee the reality of co-operation in the cases. 
This observation calls some further understanding of the legal framework of co-operatives in the countries of our 
cases. 
 
1 SUMA Worker owned food  co-operative
Ethos 2 John Lewis Employee owned business
3 Tesco Share based corporation
6 4 Soletiname
5 L'Autre Bout du Monde
5 6 Coursive Boutarik
Fanny & Alexander not included
4 7 Co-op E
8 IndependentTheatre Council
3 9 Orchestra of the Age of Enlightnement
Red Ladder not inlcuded
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4.  Comparison of the French, British & Italian legal framework regarding co-ops  
This section examines the similarities and differences in the three countries’ legislative and regulative 
regimes with regard to co-operatives and social benefit.  This is a complicated area.  The different legal forms in 
France and the UK are summarised in the table in Appendix 3. 
While the legal system which regulates the cooperative regime in France, the UK and Italy refers to the 
definition given by the International Cooperative Alliance
14
, the legal framework applicable to cooperatives 
differs in some particulars within the three countries. In the UK, industrial and provident societies were regulated 
                                                          
13 Since two legal forms for co-operative exist in France, we selected one of each: a SCOP and a SCIC. These legal parameters are 
further discussed in a later  part of the chapter. 
14 "A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically controlled enterprise". 
under Industrial and Provident Societies law. This has now, after public consultation in 2007, been amalgamated 
into the Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies and Credit Unions Act 2010. The UK Act defines a co-
operative as “a society for carrying on any industry, business or trade (Ch7, Art1. sec1) [… but not with …] the 
object of making profits mainly for the payment of interest, dividends or bonuses on money invested or deposited 
with, or lent to, the society or any other person"(Ch7,Art1, sec2). A community benefit society is defined as one 
where “the business of the society is being, or is intended to be, conducted for the benefit of the community”(Ch7, 
Art1, sec3). In France the "Loi n°47-1775" regulates the co-operatives legal system. The purpose of the French 
co-operative act, is (art.1) to reduce the price of sale of some products or services, by the common effort of 
members and in their advantage; to Improve the quality of products; to contribute to the satisfaction of needs and 
to the promotion of the social and economic activities of their members as well as to their training. The 
differences in the definitions reflect the different sort of legal frameworks in the two countries (Common law and 
code law) and underline the need to look past the legal definition to the ethos of the co-operative. 
A first hypothesis from the literature review was, following and extending Birchall & Simmons (2009), 
that there are synergies between co-operative forms and cultural activities, like openness, social responsibility 
and caring for others, which indicates that PAO's should opt for co-operative status. One of these synergies 
concerns social utility. This notion is closely linked with public interest, general interest and social interest 
concepts, but this concept actually lacks a unique definition.  In France, any legal form of business could be 
recognised for their public interest. A significant portion of PAOs benefit from this legal recognition, called 
"être reconnu d'Intérêt général", and which confers both some fiscal advantages
15
 and a perceived legitimacy in 
the sphere of action. To have public interest recognition some essential conditions must be met
16
. They relate to 
philanthropic, educational, scientific, social, humanitarian, sports and family character or can contribute to the 
development of artistic heritage, and the protection of the environment. To be able to deliver fiscal certificates to 
their members, the management of the institution has to be in a managing volunteer system. In addition it must 
not have a lucrative activity and must not benefit only a restricted circle of people. Within co-operatives, the 
relatively new status of "Société Coopérative d'Intérêt Collectif" (SCIC)
17
 (co-operative with public interest) is 
of specific interest regarding these dispositions. To create a SCIC in PAO's activities requires demonstrating the 
"social utility" of these activities on private or public cultural sector
18
. In order to have this "utilité sociale" status, 
a legal framework exists whose main norms are stated in the "décret n° 2002-240", "la loi n° 98-657" and the 
"code du travail, article L.322-4-18." 
19
  
A similar status exists in Italy. In the Italian legal system the expression " Organizzazione non lucrativa 
di utilità sociale" (known by the acronym ONLUS) indicates a category of institutions while chiefly pursuing 
some social or artistic aim (associations, co-ops, non-profit organisation, etc.) to which the law confers the 
ability to enjoy tax benefits
20
.  
Rather like "utilité publique" in France, "public benefit" in the UK is not easy to define
21
. It is not 
sufficient to have charitable purposes
22; the charity’s activities must be for the benefit of the public. This means 
that all charities in the UK, no matter what their specific purpose is, operate with a wider social perspective. 
                                                          
15 The general French tax law says that donations made by private individuals for these institutions receive a tax benefit. The State 
pays half of the donation in the form of tax reduction. The donations and the contributions of members paid to the association are concerned 
by this provided that the member receives no counterparty (compensation) in his payment. 
16 The institution has to have more than 200 shareholders (partners, participants) and its budget should be over 45 000 euros. In 
addition, the organization must demonstrate more than three years of continuous activities for public or national causes. 
17 Created by the law of 17 July 2001 
18 It means the mobilization of the economic and social resources in the local plan and encourages the participation of all the local 
people in these activities and therefore resulting in better economic, social and territorial cohesion. 
19 In order to obtain the status of "utilité sociale" it is necessary for the cooperative to be recognized by the public authorities 
(préfet). A dossier with all the documents which show evidence of its activities, such as social and professional integration, must be 
submitted and approved. Art. 1-3 du Décret n° 2002-241 du 21 février 2002 relatif à la SCIC. 
20  Art. 10 del d.lgs. 4 dicembre 1997, n. 460, " Riordino della disciplina tributaria degli enti non commerciali e delle 
organizzazioni non lucrative di utilità sociale." 
21 "Public benefit" is not specifically defined in the Charities Act 2011. 
22 Historically, charitable purposes were defined as the relief of poverty, advancement of education or the advancement of religion 
and other purposes beneficial to the community. The 2006 Act retains the first three and expands the fourth to cover:  the advancement of 
health or the saving of lives; the advancement of citizenship or community development; the advancement of the arts, culture, heritage or 
science; the advancement of human rights, conflict resolution or reconciliation or the promotion of religious or racial harmony or equality 
and diversity; (…) 
They have to demonstrate this each year through a statement of public benefit. The Charity Commission is 
currently investigating established charities to ensure that they are complying with the public benefit requirement. 
Charities
23
in the UK are regulated by the Charities Act 2011. A charity is not a legal form or structure but a 
status. This means that different legal forms can be charities (see Table in Appendix 3) The most common is an 
association or a company limited by guarantee, but a co-operative set up for the community benefit can also have 
charitable status. There are two requirements for charitable status - firstly an organisation must be established for 
exclusively charitable purposes
24
 and secondly the actions must be for the public benefit
25
. The Community 
Interest Company - created in the UK under the Companies Act 2004 - is similar to the French SCIC. A CIC is a 
type of limited company (as in France) “designed specifically for those wishing to operate for the benefit of the 
community rather than for the benefit of the owners of the company”26. A company limited by guarantee can also 
be a CIC. However a registered charity cannot be a CIC and many arts organisations in the UK are registered as 
charities. Historically, arts organizations in the UK have registered as charities for several reasons – tax 
concessions (on donations, on surpluses, on premises) and funders’ requirements (charities have an “asset lock” 
to safeguard resources) are probably the most important.   
Although UK legislation allows for a CIC to be a co-operative, it does not need to be one. It cannot, 
however, be a registered charity, although it can be the subsidiary company of a registered charity. It is a 
relatively new legal form but growing in popularity, with 6,400 registered since 2004, 76% as companies limited 
by guarantee, and the numbers being registered increasing annually. A characteristic of the UK CIC, embodying 
the prioritizing of community benefit over that of the owners, is that it has an “asset lock” which means that it 
cannot distribute all its profits but must retain the larger proportion to further its social aims. A Community 
Interest Company in the UK must, as a SCIC must in France, demonstrate its social credentials. This is done 
through an annual statement of community benefit. CICs do not enjoy the same tax benefits as charities do, 
although they have a primarily community interest. Non-profit making associations' (à but non-lucratif) 
regulated by the “Loi 1901”, particularly in the cultural sector, in France work within a holistic social perspective. 
UK arts charities can be compared to these non-profit associations.  
In Italy, there is a long standing statutory legal and regulatory framework for co-operatives
27
, providing 
them with recognition and support. The basis of these legal provisions is the constitution's recognition that co-
operatives fulfill a social function; the Italian Constitution itself explicitly recognizes the social function of co-
operation and its contribution to the country. Article 45 of the Italian Constitution provides as follows: "The 
Republic recognises the social function of co-operation for mutual benefit free of private speculation. The law 
shall assist and promote its development by the most suitable means and shall ensure, by means of appropriate 
controls, its nature and purposes. "
28
 
Co-operatives enjoy special rights under the Italian Constitution – e.g. special tax advantages and no 
formal requirements for the creation or running of the business, etc.   In 1991, Law 381/91, which recognised 
and supported the role of social co-operatives in providing services for the wider public or collective good
29
, 
radically extended the scope of co-operatives.  
This legal perspective leads us to consider that although some differences exist between the French, 
British and Italian legal frameworks regarding PAO's, co-operatives and social / public interest concepts (and 
                                                          
23 The Charities Act 2011 (which received Royal Assent on 14 December 2011 and come into force on 14 March 2012) combines 
the Recreational Charities Act 1958, the Charities Act 1993 and many of the provisions of the Charities Act 2006. 
24 Chapter 1, section 1 (1,a) of The Charities Act 2011 
25 Chapter 1, section 2 (1,b) of The Charities Act 2011 
26 Office of the Community Interest Company regulator, Department of Business, Innovation & Skills,  
27 Codice civile. TITOLO VI. Delle società cooperative e delle mutue assicuratrici (Art. 2511- Art. 2548); Legislative Decree No 
1577 of the Provisional Head of State of 14 December 1947; Articles 10,11,12,13 and 14 of Presidential Decree N° 601 of 1973; LEGGE N° 
38, Disciplina delle cooperative sociali, 18 novembre 1991; LEGGE N° 59, Nuove norme in materia di societa' cooperative, 31 gennaio 1992; 
DECRETO LEGISLATIVO N° 6, 17 gennaio 2003, Riforma organica della disciplina delle societa' di capitali e societa' cooperative, in 
attuazione della legge N° 366, 3 ottobre 2001. 
28 Costituzione della repubblica italiana  
Art. 45 : La Repubblica riconosce la funzione sociale della cooperazione a carattere di mutualità e senza fini di speculazione 
privata. La legge ne promuove e favorisce l’incremento con i mezzi più idonei e ne assicura, con gli opportuni controlli, il carattere e le 
finalità. 
29 LEGGE 8 novembre 1991. Art. 1. Definizione : 1. Le cooperative sociali hanno lo scopo di perseguire  l'interesse generale della 
comunita' alla  promozione  umana  e  all'integrazione sociale dei cittadini attraverso: 
a) la gestione di servizi socio-sanitari ed educativi; b) lo svolgimento di attivita' diverse -  agricole,  industriali, commerciali o di 
servizi - finalizzate all'inserimento lavorativo  di persone svantaggiate. 2. Si applicano alle cooperative sociali, in quanto compatibili con la 
presente legge, le norme relative al settore in cui le cooperative stesse operano. 3. La  denominazione  sociale,  comunque  formata,  deve  
contenere l'indicazione di "cooperativa sociale". 
taxation principles and incentives), they are largely comparable. While in the UK almost any legal form can 
register as a co-operative, in France and Italy co-operative recognition corresponds to a legal status. In all cases 
however, public / collective interest is based on  registration and submitted to an official recognition process, 
which provides some advantages. In France and Italy the co-operative form is compatible with public interest 
recognition; in the UK it is compatible but not the first choice for performing arts organisations.  They are 
predominantly registered charities and would not seem to need co-operative registration for their social benefit 
objectives to be officially recognised and rewarded (through tax reliefs).  When focusing on PAO's endorsing the 
co-operative ethos, which is the case of the organisations we observe, we note that, while in the UK they remain 
charities, in France and Italy they choose a co-operative legal form (SCOP or SCIC). This phenomenon remains 
marginal at a quantitative level in France. This calls several observations:  
- The synergy we expected between social purposes, philosophy in the arts and co-operative values 
seems meaningful ; 
- The PAO's we have studied  are following the co-operative taxonomy we have used (Practical tool) ; 
- Yet, this does not lead those companies to register as a co-op in the UK while they adopt co-
operative status in France. This suggests that the British co-operative framework may not be 
adapted for performing arts, although the co-operative ethos is. 
- Finally, co-operative status for PAO's in France remain marginal; this suggests that the co-operative 
status in French may be insufficently adapted to PAO's. 
We further discuss this in the following part, by exploring the comparison of perceived obstacles and advantages 
of cooperation in each country cases.  
6. Hypothesis from the literature : pro's & con's 
Urrutiaguer and Henry (2011) observe that theatre companies who adopt co-operative principles (such 
as mutualisation or collective managerial boards) are primarily motivated by their democratic purpose: they want 
to have a shared decision process regarding artistic orientation and budget constraints. They also observe that 
such companies tend to have a broader distribution area (inter-regions or international).  
Co-operation also is also expected to assist PAO's reduce their fixed costs (administration & distribution) 
by accessing more specialised skills and sharing resources among several companies (Sinapi & Juno-Delgado, 
2011, Vigne et Fouche, 2005). While a single company is too small to hire an accountant, a lawyer, a 
communication manager etc., shared resource centres may afford it. Observations show that such practice exists 
within artistic networks (Urrutiaguer & Henry, 2011): they take the form of non-monetary exchanges of 
resources based on reciprocity principles, of shared offices, equipment, spaces and expertise. Besides, 3% of the 
observed companies use shared employment centres ("groupements d'employeurs") for administrative work. In 
addition, co-operative forms, because they include obligations to build reserves and retain part of the profit, may 
help PAO's to have higher level of equities and thus promote their financial sustainability. Contrary to  
traditional companies which can distribute their profits in the proportions they decide, French co-operatives are 
subjected to a specific regime. In the case of Scop, at least 16 % of profits (in practice 45 %) are taken into  "not 
share reserves ", which are property of the company and not of the partners. These reserves are allocated to 
investments and  development, but they are useful during difficult periods. 33% of profits maximum (and in 
practice 10 %) are paid in the form of dividends to the partners. The rest, at least 25 % (and in practice 45 %), is 
transformed "part work" or into participation paid to all the employees (associated or not). In the case of SCIC 
cooperatives, 15% of benefits called "excédents nets de gestion (ENG)", is allowed to be kept in the "legal 
reserve" and 50% of the rest is allowed in form of "not share reserve" to the "Fond de developpement". So, at the 
end, 57, 5% of benefits is in reserve (15 % ENG + 50 % (ENG - 15%) = 57, 5 % ENG)
 
. In this French co-
operatives are similar to UK charities.  The guidance is that charities should build up reserves to cover between 
three and six months running/operating costs.  Charities cannot distribute surpluses tomembers. 
An “advocate" of co-operative forms for PAO's in France is G. Buisson (2009). He suggests a specific 
scheme, in the form of an artists’ cooperative, financially managed by public authorities. It may be discussed 
whether this proposal really complies with Atherton et al's criteria (regarding autonomy esp.). It has so far not 
been implemented.  
Another defence for PAO's co-operative is that of Urrutiaguer & Henry (2011). They view performing 
arts as a hybrid between market and public service logics. A third logic needs to prevail, based on reciprocal and 
wider network exchanges. The current dominant legal form within the sector is not coherent with such a 
perspective. Co-operation may thus be of particular interest in the need for new governance models. Such co-op's 
would  group together companies who would share expertise and funds, in order to mutualize on the one hand 
artistic and commercial risk, on the other hand profits from successful productions. Systems of "parrainages"
30
 
(as discussed in the case studies summary above and as exist among marionettes companies), between 
established companies and emerging ones, would come under such a project. 
Beyond those sector specific factors for co-operative forms, some more general pro's and con's from the 
co-op' literature may be transposed to the performing arts sector. According to Shah (1996), the main purpose for 
a co-op is to create value for members. Five types of benefits from membership were identified in agricultural 
co-op's by Krivokapic-Skoko (2002), including market access, enhanced pricing, improved productivity from 
pooling resources, access to information, knowledge and technology and community building opportunities. The 
first can be transposed to the performing arts if we consider how arts organisations work to develop their 
“market” – both ITC and the OAE (UK studies) can be seen as having contributed to the development of their 
sub-sectors of the larger arts sector throughout their life -times, increasing opportunities for performance and 
more stable funding and trading opportunities for their members and the wider sub-sector. Pooling of 
(administrative esp.) resources to decrease fixed costs and access to (legal, managerial and administrative) 
information and skills correspond to ideas set out above. Regarding community building opportunities, we 
expect that co-operation may either help develop artistic collaboration opportunities within the co-op and/or 
within the co-op movement. Besides, co-op's are showed to provide a better control on input / output and /or on 
prices (Tennbakk, 2004) or to ensure fair conditions on the market by 'keeping it honest' (Drake & Llewellyn, 
2001). Co-operation may in this sense increase PAO's and artists’ bargaining power and thus assist in achieving 
better prices by theatres. On the other hand, the fierce and exacerbated artistic competition among companies 
(Urrutiaguer and Henry, 2011) may prevent companies recognising the advantage of such collaboration and 
prevent it taking place, as would the well -known results of the "prisoner dilemma" in game theory  
The co-operative literature also identifies generic drawbacks which may apply to PAO's co-op. In the 
medium or long term, the co-operative spirit among members may decrease while restrictive behaviours and 
selfish workers’ attitudes develop, within members and hired workers ; the efficiency of the co-op would 
decrease and this would endanger its survival in the medium term, because of the absence of efficient monitoring 
managerial policies (Ben-Ner, 2012). The long term sustainability of co-ops may thus be reduced compared to 
traditional business, because of a diminishing in the loyalty to the co-operative or to its identity. 
Finally, a starting point to discuss arts and co-operatives lies in an expected common interest or 
philosophy. Arts and culture have long been recognised as public goods; arts organisations are in the majority of 
cases not-for profit and recognised as being  of public interest. The parallel with co-operative values is at least 
intuitive. Yet, as stated by Birchall & Simmons (2009), although an overlap between member value (within co-
ops) and wider social interest may be expected, it is not necessary. There might be a difference between "the 
primary aims of the co-operative, which are to meet the members' economic needs […] and aggregate effects in 
the wider society". According to Levi & Davis (2008), co-operatives are too economically focused for the non-
profit sector. We should examine if they are –or not- too economically focused for performing arts organisations.  
7. Improved resilience? The effect of the crisis on PAO's and expected advantages of co-operative forms 
On top of the above general advantages or obstacles of co-operatives for PAO's, an implicit and major 
advantage lies in the expected improved resilience of co-operatives in the current economic context . Co-
operatives have proved to be more resilient compared to other types of business vis-à vis the crisis ((Brassard & 
Molina, 2012). Does this propriety apply to PAO? At least two factors would defend this hypothesis ; within 
France, performing arts co-operatives are expected to have more a business like orientation (Urrutiaguer & 
                                                          
30 This idea of parrainage co-operatives may also be recognised in G. Buisson's proposal to create publicly funded artistic co-
operatives around an artistic personality, hiring as permanent young artists for a while and thus ensuring financial and job security to those 
artists. This idea was not implemented but highlights the expected link between co-operative and resilience or sustainability of arts. 
Henry, 2011) ; they are expected to be less financially fragile thanks to higher equity levels – compared to 
associations – and better fixed cost coverage thanks to mutualisation of administrative costs (Sinapi & Juno 
Delgado, 2011). Co-operation may thus be a way to reduce the inherent fragility of PAOs and the effects of the 
crisis on the sector. While PAO's revenues have reduced significantly in the context of the economic crisis in the 
UK and Italy, the French situation is more subtle. At first glance, French companies' resources have been stable 
and even increasing in the last years. This hides however several realities showing a less advantageous situation. 
The first fragility factor of theatre companies lies in their insufficient equity level (Greffe and Simonnet, 2010). 
This is related to at least three factors : associations,the main legal forms within PAO's, have no paid in capital ; 
reserves can thus only be created from retained earnings. This requires a surplus being generated, which is quite 
unlikely. First for lack of managerial skills regarding estimation of working capital and reserves levels ; second 
in some cases for a misinterpretation of the non-lucrative criteria (confusion between non-lucrative and no profit 
understood as no surplus) (Sinapi & Juno-Delgado, 2011); third, because the economic and sector specific 
context makes the generation of surplus very difficult. 
Indeed, although seemingly level, funding to theatres has reduced. French PAO's are heavily dependent 
upon direct public funding (39% on average of company's budgets). While direct public funds to theatre have 
been stable overall, if expressed in real terms, part of them has actually been decreasing since 2007
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. The main 
sources of revenues are sales of productions, which consists, in a large part, in indirect public funding since those 
sales are to public theatres. Those sales have been reducing in the last decade to dangerous levels : unit selling 
price per show has reduced and is often at marginal price ("coût plateau"), while the number of representations 
per production is dropping. This is the result of the fierce competition among companies towards theatres
32
; 
PAO's also rely heavily on non-monetary resources, in the form of (unpaid and undeclared) work, under the 
specific French scheme of "régime d'intermittence"
33
, often done at the limits of legal rules. The conditions of 
this scheme have strengthened in the last five years and the apparent complaisance of regulators regarding its 
excessive use in the past is over. Besides the reduction in effective resources, we may add that administrative 
costs remain heavy for small organisations (second budget line and cost allocation source). This all the more 
crucial as public funding generally will not cover administrative costs
34
 (Urrutiaguer & Henry, 2011). There is 
even an incentive to show losses, according to the cases answers : subsidies are not provided if a budget shows a 
surplus. To this financial risk should be added an artistic risk : surpluses are required to fund artistic research and 
creation, which is in the current context thus at risk. 
The picture within the UK is rather different. There is a problem with the under-capitalisation of the arts 
in general and this has been under discussion for some time. There have been a number of responses. The 
Charity Commission, which regulates UK registered charities, has recommended for a number of years, that all 
charities (whether in the arts or not) should amass free unrestricted reserves (i.e. not tied up in fixed assets and 
not dedicated to particular projects) of between three and six months’ running costs. Charities have realised the 
importance of building up reserves. This does not mean that it is easy for an arts organisation to build up this 
level of reserves but it is, at least, recognised as important that they do. The development of Community Interest 
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 In particular DRAC's subsidies to theatre and dance, after inflation deduction; Sources : Chantal 
Lacroix (2010 et 2009), Chiffres clés 2010, Paris, MCC, pp66-87 & Chiffres clés 2009 (p129), Urrutiaguer & Henry 
(2011) ; according to the ANRAT (Association Nationale de Recherche d'Action Théâtrale), the fees paid by the 
DRAC for artistic workshops in schools have not increased since the 1980's. 
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 The number of companies have significantly increased in te last decades, without the audience – nor 
the public theatre funds – to expand. As a result, shows' sales unit price are decreasing while the number of 
representation per show is dangerously decreasing. 
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 This regime corresponds to the specific French scheme of unemployment benefit for artists and 
technicians in the arts. It may represent 19% to 26% of performing arts companies' budgets and 75% of work 
contracts (Observatoire Prospectif des Métiers et des qualifications di spectacle vivant, Tableau de bord de 
l'emploi et de la formation professionnelle dans le spectacle vivant. Première édition, mai 2011.) The system 
may be viewed as a disguised public subsidy to artistic work, which is being reduced significantly in these crisis 
years in France. 
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 Public subsidies are mostly dedicated to funding artistic production costs (not fixed costs nor in 
many cases artistic research can be funded); cultural activity fees often even forbid any fixed cost coverage 
Companies (CICs) in the UK was partly in response to the difficulties not- for- profit organisations face in 
attracting investment. CICs are allowed to pay dividends on some external investment although they still have an 
“asset lock” and a primarily community purpose. A CIC is a different path for an organisation than charitable 
registration, although a charity can have a CIC as a subsidiary. It is a fairly new legal form but is growing in 
popularity. 
Charities in the UK do not pay tax on surpluses generated through charitable activities, nor on profits 
made by trading which are gifted to the charity (by a subsidiary company for instance). CICs do not enjoy any 
tax breaks. 
Unpaid time is a factor within the arts sector in the UK as well as in France but for different reasons. 
Charity legislation does not allow board members, who are responsible, legally and financially, for the 
organisation to be paid. This means that the performing arts organisations which are registered charities have 
unpaid boards. This can lead to problems in that board members do not necessarily have enough time to give to 
the organisation; it can decrease diversity as only those with leisure time can afford to take on the responsibility. 
And it is an aspect of charity work that is being badly affected by the current economic crisis. This requirement 
is under review and may be dropped in the future. It is thought to be one of the reasons why charities find it 
difficult to attract board members with financial and legal skills. Many arts organisations rely heavily upon 
volunteer time – as board members and as company members. 
As regards the fragility brought about by the lack of management skills, recognising the need in the 
sector, the Independent Theatre Council (one of the case study organisations) was set up, more than twenty years 
ago, to provide shared legal and contractual advice and management training for the small independent theatre 
company sector.   The Arts Council has for many years subsidised training for arts administrators and capacity 
building for arts organisations. 
The economic crisis in France has not meant a reduction in direct funding to PAO's, mainly because of 
the states' contra-cyclical action. Yet, those funds have risen less quickly than fixed costs and inflation. Invisible 
(non-monetary) resources are decreasing and at risk (intermittence esp.). Finally, in the context of state and 
regions' budget constraints, it is reasonable to expect further reductions in public subsidies for culture, regional 
funds and short term financing. In the UK, cuts have already been made in the budget for culture (discussed 
further through the case studies) and, similarly as in France, there is increasing pressure on the non-monetary 
resources upon which the sector depends. 
 
8. Perceived advantages & obstacles of co-operative PAO's: comparative results from the cases 
 
In this part, we compare the answers and observations of our selected cases regarding co-operatives 
perceived pro's and con's and seek both converging and contrasting evidence. We structure the comparison on 
the stage of development and the country criteria, which we compare to the literature hypotheses.. 
Ex-post cases 
"Ex post" cases (co-ops which have ceased to be co-operative) highlight crucial obstacles for co-ops in PAO. 
The French company 4l12 is ceasing to be a co-op because its activity was no longer (financially) sustainable. 
This unsustainability is thus independent from the co-operative form: the cuts in public funding as well as 
weakened loyalty of their historic partners to their artistic projects are the reasons. On the other hand, Red 
Ladder ceased to be a co-op (in the mid 80s) while continuing its activities. Here, the co-op form in itself is in 
question. The political climate in the UK under the Thatcher government in the mid 80s was hostile to co-
operatives in the arts. Several arts co-operatives either ceased to be co-ops or ceased activities in the mid- 80s. 
Mostly, they have not reformed as co-operatives.  Red Ladder has not become a co-operative again, despite 
discussing the option regularly, because of the stifling of artistic risk-taking in the co-operative model and the 
inflexibility and length of the decision making process. Nonetheless it remains loyal to the fundamental principle 
of working in collaboration and it operates a system of “parrainage” for emerging artists and companies in the 
region. 
4l12 case, whilst not specifically rejecting the co-operative form for PAo's, is nonetheless very negative about it, 
Viewing it as too bureaucratic (some specific obligations towards the co-operative federations not existing in an 
association). Being a co-operative entails exclusion from some of the public subsidies. Finally, the rule regarding 
retained earnings is perceived as incompatible with the concept of unrestricted reserves, required to finance 
artistic research and creation. The co-operative form did not increase resilience, since it did not help 4/12 
weather the public cuts
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. They also feel that the commercial purpose of a co-operative is not compatible with 
their artistic organisation and their non-lucrative spirit. They are however still loyal to part of the co-operative 
ethos : democracy and member (artists) control over artistic choices and their job. 
These ex-post cases were expected to provide critical drawbacks of co-operative forms for PAO's. After more 
than 20 years of existence as a co-op in both cases, we observe that the initial loyalty to co-operative principles  
(democracy and member control) is still valid for 4/12, though not as important for Red Ladder, where looser 
collaborative arrangements are more important.  Time proved that bureaucracy and the lengthy decision making 
process in co-ops is an obstacle to co-ops for PAO's, as expected in the literature. To this is added sector specific 
findings : the consensus based decision process is an obstacle to artistic risk taking. We also identify some 
country specific obstacles : the political image of co-ops in the UK, the benefits of charitable status and the 
public interest recognition that confers in the UK, the exclusion from some cultural public funding schemes in 
France. Finally, two hypotheses from the literature are not confirmed: developing free riding or restrictive 
behaviours over time is not mentioned by either of our long term cases. Nor is improved resilience with co-op 
form convincing from the 4l12 and Red Ladder cases. Further research would obviously be required on this last 
finding. 
9. "Ex ante"  & "in" cases 
In contrast to the above "ex-post" cases, the ex ante cases (organisations considering becoming co-
operatives or having just registered) are expected to provide a positive picture regarding co-op for PAO's and to 
highlight its main perceived advantages. 
We observe that ITC, although only considering becoming a registered co-op, may be viewed as having 
acted in accordance with co-operative principles since it was initially set up. The main advantage expected from 
registering as a co-operative relates to the image of co-operation, which would better express the reality of the 
way in which they operate. It might also be expected to reinforce members’ loyalty to ITC values. Finally, the 
co-operative movement and image may help ITC, which already is a representative voice for the sector, to 
network with organisations beyond the sector which share its collaborative ethos.  We also find similar expected 
pro's in the Coop-e Italian case: they aim to be a representative voice, more powerful thanks to a broader 
representation linked to the co-operation among several organisations. This first result seems particularly 
interesting: contrary to the expectations that the strength of co-operation towards the market (as a larger 
representation) may not apply to PAO, we view that it may be the one of the more important advantages of co-
operation, even though taking a form specific to the sector. What is at stake is the representation and lobbying 
towards public authority and, maybe, the appropriation of cultural public policy (in terms of fund allocation and 
artistic project selection) by artists themselves. The question of their legitimacy to achieve such a function may 
be questioned. The legitimacy and democracy attached to the co-operative form may be an answer to this 
objection. 
We also find a wide variety of pro's and con's, which are for some of them largely convergent, 
independently from the ex ante / in criteria nor from the country criteria. 
We find that the more largely shared incentive for co-operation is member control and democracy : 
members (artists) want to have control over their artistic choices and, to some extent, upon their employment (or 
                                                          
35 This may be nuanced, since 4l12's retained earnings enabled the company to survive during 2 years after the start of financial 
cuts. Although insufficient vis à vis the economic crisis impact, this may be perceived as a factor of (limited) resilience. 
work), through co-operation (OAE, 4l12, Red Ladder, Coop E, Solentiname). This is not related to the 
registration or legal recognition but to  conformity to co-operative principles.  
The choice for a co-operative form appears as a militant act in a converging way. Co-op E, Solentiname, 
L'autre bout du Monde find in this  one of their primary motivations to be a co-op ; also Red Ladder and 4l12 
refer to such militancy, even though the context (period of the eighties) was different. The object of this 
militancy has to do with the philosophical and sometimes political values and image attached to the co-operative 
movement. We observe also in three cases that the claim does not only relate to the political image: it is also a 
way to claim to be a cultural enterprise, ie : to be recognised (and to function) as entrepreneurs. This claim is 
observed among "younger" generation within our cases (COOP E, Solentiname, Peniche Cancale). This suggests 
that a new generation of PAO's aims at developing the professionalization of their activity (as opposed to the 
"common" image that artists are not managers), and the seriousness in management and organisation, which is 
claimed through co-operative registration. 
In a less converging way, we find in some cases results confirming the effectiveness of a majority of the 
hypotheses from the literature. 
 Solentiname, ITC, Co-op E, Coursive Boutaric view overall financial advantages to co-op as attached 
to mutualisation (mutualisation of fixed costs and managerial skills) and /or to improved retained earnings ; this 
last objective attached to co-operatives is expected to increase resilience and facilitate the financing of artistic 
research and creation. While this of significant importance for Solentiname and ITC, it is rather a secondary 
factor for the other cases. Finally, in some of the French cases, the co-operative form provides access to specific 
public funding (Peniche Cancale, Coursive Boutaric) : this is limited to the SCIC legal form and has to do with 
the common interest recognition rather than the fact that it is co-operative (there are specific public schemes and 
networks among SCIC which are viewed as providing significant help). In Italy, the co-operative federation is 
also seen as very helpful (help to create / manage). This is not mentioned in the British nor French cases, and 
even seen as inefficient or contra-productive (because not adapted to PAO) in one French case (4l12). In the UK 
charitable, rather than co-operative, status confers funding and tax benefits. The expected advantages of co-
operative recognition resulting from the belonging to a large and organised network is thus not confirmed in a 
converging way ; we observe significant country differences, suggesting that the Italian case may be an example 
to expand to France and maybe to the UK. Besides, in two French cases (Solentiname, 4l12), being a registered 
co-operative has been incompatible with some specific public funds (specific aid on cost of employees "CAE", 
local public funds to culture in some regions : "subventions départementales"). This last observation looks 
illogical within French cultural policy and would is an obvious candidate for change.  
We also observe cases where the co-operative includes the action of parrainage among members (ITC, 
Red Ladder, Coop E). In the case of Coop E it is a primary reason for becoming a co-op. This confirms the 
literature’s hypothesis.   
Cases also confirm some expected obstacles of co-ops in PAO : we find converging perceptions that the 
complexity of democratic processes makes them cumbersome that (Orchestra of the Age of Enlightenment 
especially makes this point)  ; one case also mentions the danger of “free riding” (Coursive Boutaric). 
Last, a key literature hypothesis is invalidated by the cases : competition among artists is expected to 
prevent artists from real cooperation. Our results show the opposite. Collaboration and the "love" for other artists 
work is a strong motive for co-operation, Coop E 's conclusion to our case is, in our view, the better conclusion 
to our results : "In 1998, we met Ostermeier (Director of 'La baraque', nominated around the Schaubühne, he 
was then very young). We discussed with him about our relationships with other Italian artists and they told us : 
'Competition ? In their view others are competitors. But not for us'. We have built a co-operative after years of 
collaboration. We are happy to see young companies engaged in the same process as ours. There is something in 
the air, in culture, in the city, where collaboration is more important than competition. Theatre is a very small 
art form, very fragile, compared to TV, radio etc. and so the audience is always incomplete ; it is a very small 
market, which can always be developed. Therefore, competition is a false problem in theatre. Collaboration will 
enlarge theatre, will develop the audience and will enable the market to expand". (verbatim) 
  
 
4. Conclusion : perspectives & recommendations 
 
Co-operative status may thus be considered a better adapted legal status (than associations) in the 
French case, because it is more clearly compatible with sufficient equity levels and incentives to create and 
retain earnings, which are required to finance on the one hand artistic research and creation and on the other 
hand short term financial needs (working capital & treasury requirements). Such an improved financial structure 
(equity levels coherent with productivity and growth prospects) could also give (better) access to bank financing, 
at least for short term needs. Yet it might be recalled that the financial constraint (access to bank financing) is 
more related to activity sector than to the legal form, co-operative in particular does not imply a lower financial 
constraint (Lerman & Parliament, 1990, 1991). Regarding profit and reserves levels, while profit level usually is 
independent from the legal form (co-op pr not esp), the retention rate is often superior for co-operatives, which 
tends to confirm our conclusion. Our view is thus that if co-op may help, the real solution lies not in a legal form 
change, but in better skilled performing arts administrators and in the professionalization of the sector. In this 
prospect, a co-operative movement, well aware of the arts sector characteristics, may be part of the solution. 
In the UK, the company limited by guarantee with charitable status (with the reserve retention 
recommendations and the tax reliefs available), seems to provide a more flexible form for performing arts 
organisations than a co-operative does. The need for bank or investor financing can be met through a community 
interest company – which can even be a subsidiary of the charity. It is possible to adopt a co-operative ethos 
within this form and give priority to collaboration and democratic processes but organisations which do this are 
not considered part of the co-operative movement unless they specifically register as a co-op. It seems to us that 
this is a missed opportunity on both sides and that further work on the potential synergies between performing 
arts (particularly co-creation through collaboration and participation) and co-operatives would be worthwhile. 
 Co-operatives historically hold capital assets, the tools of production, in common.  In agricultural 
processing, particularly, control of capital assets is fundamental. For cultural organisations, and particularly 
performing organisations, the control of capital assets has less meaning.  The fundamental concerns for these 
organisations are human - the control of the artistic production and security of work for members, the quality of 
the work, artistic freedom and choice (of how to work and who to work with),  within a collaborative context, 
and often, the wider social benefit, the creation of a better world through wider participation in artistic creation. 
This leads us to conjecture that cultural co-operatives need a form which reflects this reality – where 
collaboration is more important than capital.  Robin Murray in Co-operation in the Age of Google (2010), 
echoing Restakis’s title Co-operation in the Age of Capital, argues that we are currently witnessing, in the 
networking activities on the internet, a revolution which is redrawing the economic landscape shifting the 
emphasis from capital to collaboration.  We would argue that cultural organisations, exemplified by our 
performing arts case studies, demonstrate this economic shift and have already developed, and are continuing to 
develop, collaborative forms for this new landscape but official co-operative recognition lags behind them.. 
 We suggest that the form best suited to performing arts organisations would be a hybrid between 
charities/associations a but non-lucratif and co-operatives, where the emphasis is on membership control and 
collaboration rather than control of capital.  Atherton et al’s toolkit is already moving in this direction but we 
would take it further. 
The essential characteristics of these arts co-operatives would be: 
 Member democratic control rather than ownership.  It is important to leave open the possibility of an 
organisation not having any owners (charities and associations) or having an asset lock to keep 
significant assets in the organisation; 
 Recognition of the primacy of artistic purpose, before profit and as a social benefit in itself rather than 
an instrument to bring about social benefit.  The organisations we have studied have artistic creation as 
their primary purpose and we believe that it is important to distinguish this artistic creation from wider 
social benefit.  The benefit to society is through the artisitic creation not just through the relation 
building and networking etc. that the creating entails. 
 Networking – with other co-operatives and other arts organisations; 
 Benefits for members are, to some extent, specific to the sector. The main value for members is that of 
the artistic stimulation from collaboration and debate with other artists within the co-operative.  Other 
benefits include some degree of security of employment/work, shared support through mutualisation, a 
voice for the sector and increased political force.   
 
These arts co-operatives – with cultural objectives – would fulfil the public benefit requirements 
necessary for charitable status in the UK, and we recommend that they enjoy the benefits of such status 
– tax relief on surpluses generated and donations, and business rates relief.  They should be able to 
accept sponsorship, generate surpluses and also follow the guidance that reserves should be built up in 
order to improve resilience. Assets should be locked into the organisation for  long-term development 
(through R&D) of the artistic work. 
  
 We would argue that it is important to recognise these organisations as primarily cultural – 
with primacy of artistic purpose (before profit and sometimes in opposition to it) and primacy of 
collaboration over capital. The recognition of this form as part of the co-operative movement would 
increase the strength of the arguments within the cultural sector concerning the importance of 
collaborative activity, networking and sharing in the cultural economy, and the relative unimportance of 
profit. It would allow the recognition of cultural organisations as genuine, if different, economic agents 
and would strengthen the co-operative movement by recognising increased diversity in co-operative 
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 Atherton et al – tool kit self-diagnosis questions Document analysis 
RQ1 – What form 
does co-operation 
take in performing 
arts organisations? 
IQ3 Would you please describe the purpose of your 
organization (including main activity and key 
characteristics)? 
IQ4 Would you please specify what is the legal structure of 
your company? 
IQ5 Would you please explain how your revenues and costs 
are structured (what is the profit structure and what are the 
key figures); would it be possible to get a copy of your 
financial statements for further document's analysis? 
IQ6 Would you please explain in which way the members 
effectively control the business activity (esp: control of 
managers / directors; control of strategic decisions, control 
of day-to-day work or product / services offered)? 
Q9.Collaboration Does your organisation collaborate or trade with other co-
operatives? 
 
Q11. Community Does your organisation benefit 
society – for example by providing a community-centred service or using a 








Q2.  Membership Is membership of your organization open to anyone who is 
eligible, able and willing? 
Q3. Membership control Do your members own the organisation or have, in 
formal terms, ultimate  
control over what it does? 
Q4. Membership control Do all members have an equal say in the major decisions 
of the organisation? For example, if you are electing a Board, is it one member, one 
vote rather than the number of votes being down to how much money you have put 
in? 
 
Q5.  Control and Benefit 
Do your members directly engage in or benefit from the activity of the organisation? 
Legal constitution analysis 
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 The interview starts with a general introduction, presenting the research purpose, the interview protocol, and asking the interviewee to introduce her/himself & 
its organization (IQ1 : Would you please precise your name, position and company?). 
 
 Q6. Control and Benefit Do your members decide what to do with the profits of 
your organisation? 
 
RQ2 - What are the 
ex-post, in and ex ante 
perceived advantages 
and obstacles to being 
a coop in this sector? 
IQ7 – Depending on the "stage" of the considered 
company:  
- Why haven't you so far considered becoming a 
coop? Why have you now considered becoming a 
coop? 
- Why had you chosen to be a cooperative? 
- Why are you considering ceasing / have you 
ceased your cooperative activity? 
IQ9 - What advantages do/did you see in becoming a co-op 







IQ10 - What obstacles would you see / have you 












Q7. Learning Does your organisation set aside time 
and money to allow its members and/ 
or employees to develop their skills 
through training and education, so they 
can effectively contribute towards the 
running of the co-operative? 
Q8. Learning Do you contribute to wider public 
education or awareness around the 
benefits of co-operation? 
 
RQ3 - In particular, 
does being a 
cooperative help vis–
à-vis the economic 
crisis effects (budget 
cuts esp.)? 
IQ2. Would you please describe the history of your 
business, including critical events or periods? 
Q10 Collaboration Are you a member of a wider co-operative network that is 
recognised or affiliated to Co-operatives UK or the International Co-operative 
Alliance? 
 
Q12 Community Does your business consider and try to improve its impact in 
terms of sustainable development? 
Financial Statement analysis: 
liquidity ratio, solvency ratio, 
revenue development. 
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Q1.  Membership Do 
you have members? 
 
Yes Yes No Ye
s 
Yes No – but 
aiming to in the 
future 
Yes Yes 
Q2.  Membership Is 
membership of your organization 
open to anyone who is eligible, 
able and willing? 
 
Yes Yes – 
musical ability or 




Yes No – but 




control Do your members own 
the organisation or have, in 
formal terms, ultimate control 
over what it does? 
 
Yes Yes – but 
external board 






only the board 
Ye
s 
No – only 
the board 
No – but 




control Do all members have an 
equal say in the major decisions 
of the organisation? For example, 
if you are electing a Board, is it 
one member, one vote rather than 
the number of votes being down 





























No – but 
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Q5.  Control and 
Benefit 
Do your members 
directly engage in or benefit from 
the activity of the organisation? 
 
Yes Yes No Ye
s 
Yes No – but 
aiming to in the 
future 
Yes Yes 
Q6. Control and 
Benefit Do your members decide 

















No No – but 
aiming to in the 
future 
Yes Yes 
Q7. Learning Does 
your organisation set aside time 
and money to allow its 
members and/or employees to 
develop their skills through 
training and education, so they 
Yes Yes Yes Ye
s 
Yes No – but 
aiming to in the 
future 
No Yes 
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can effectively contribute 
towards the running of the co-
operative? 
 
Q8. Learning Do you 
contribute to wider public 
education or awareness around 
the 






















No No No Yes, not formally 
Q9.Collaboration Does 
your organisation collaborate or 























Yes Yes Yes Not yet 
Q10 Collaboration Are 
you a member of a wider co-
operative network that is 
recognised or affiliated to Co-





but of other 
collaborative 
networks 










Yes No  Yes Yes 
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Q11. Community Does 
your organisation benefit society 
– for example by providing a 
community-centred service or 
using a proportion of its profits to 
support communities? 
 

























































Q12 Community Does 
your business consider and try to 
improve its impact in terms of 
sustainable development? 
Yes Check Check N
ot known 
Yes Yes Yes Not specifically  
         
 
This mapping was done after the interviews by the researchers, not by the people interviewed for the case studies. 
 
 






pay a return on 
Does 




suitable for co-op 
French Legal form 
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No No No No No Yes Partnership 
Associati
ons 
No No No No 
(unless a 
charity) 
Yes Yes Assocaition a but 
non lucrative 
Trust No No No No 
(unless a 
charity) 




Yes No No Comp
anies house 
No Yes LLP? 
Compan
y Limited by 
Guarantee 
Yes No No Comp
anies house 
Yes Yes SARL? 
Compan
y Limited by 
shares 
Yes Yes Yes Comp
anies house 






Yes No No Comp
anies house & 
CIC regulator 




Yes Yes Yes –
although it is 
Comp
anies house & 
No Yes SCIC 
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Yes No No Chari
ty commission 







Yes Yes Yes Finan
cial Services 
Authority 




for the benefit 
of the 
community) 
Yes Yes Yes Finan
cial Services 
Authority 
Yes Yes SCIC 
        
 
* In the past some charities were registered as companies limited by shares and some are still operating with this form and charitable status.  
Adapted from Simply Legal, (2009) Co-operatives UK. 
 
 
